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I. Introduction 
Advances in communication technologies over the past half century have made the 
cultural goods of one country more readily available to consumers in another.  While lower trade 
costs are generally good news for consumers – they make a wider range of products available to 
more people – reduced transaction costs in cultural goods are greeted with much less enthusiasm.  
A large group outside economics is concerned with possible negative effects of cultural products 
from distant and large economies, particularly the US, on the local cultural products of smaller 
economies.   
The French have taken the rhetorical lead in exclaiming the American threat to local 
culture.  During the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1993, Jacques Toubon, the French 
Minister of Culture said, “We must not let our souls be asphyxiated, our eyes blinded, our 
businesses enslaved. We want to breathe freely – breathe the air that is ours, the air that has 
nourished the culture of the world, and that, tomorrow, is in danger of being lost to humanity.  
. . . Let us mobilize for this battle of survival.”1  Then-president François Mitterrand echoed 
similar sentiments:  “Let us be on guard. If the spirit of Europe is no longer menaced by the great 
totalitarian machines that we have known how to resist, it may be more insidiously threatened by 
new masters – economisme, mercantilism, the power of money, and to some extent, technology.  
. . . What is at issue is the cultural identity of nations, the right of each people to its own culture, 
the freedom to create and choose one's images. . . . A society that relinquishes to others its means 
of representation, is an enslaved society.”2 
The US dominance in the world movie industry provides the main fuel for these 
concerns.  Hollywood movies accounted for 64 percent of revenue across the 15 countries of the 
EU in 2001 (Eurostat, 2003; Waterman, 2005).  While not as large as the movie industry, the US 
recorded music industry is nevertheless substantial.  The combined 2001 value of the recorded 
music industry in the US and Europe (24 billion euros) exceeds theatrical box office (15.3 
billion) but not combined box office and DVD sales/rentals (56.2 billion euros).3  Fears of 
American dominance in music are not entirely unfounded: from 2001 through 2007, 31 artists 
have appeared simultaneously on at least 18 countries’ charts in at least one year.  Twenty three 
                                                            
1 Quoted in McMahon, Darrin. “Echoes of a Recent Past: Contemporary French Anti-Americanism in Historical and 
Cultural Perspective.” International Security Studies at Yale University, January 1995 
(http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mcd01/ ). 
2 From McMahon (1995). 
3 These figures are from European Commission (2003). 
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of these artists – Avril Lavigne, Backstreet Boys, Beyoncé, Black Eyed Peas, Britney Spears, 
Christina Aguilera, Destiny's Child, Eminem, Enrique Iglesias, Evanescense, Faith Hill, Gnarls 
Barkley, Gwen Stefani, Jennifer Lopez, Justin Timberlake, Madonna, Mariah Carey, Outkast, 
P!Nk, Red Hot Chili Peppers, Rihanna, Usher, and Vanessa Carlton – are American.4  See Table 
1. 
 While it has become easier for the world’s consumers to get access to US music, at the 
same time it may also have become easier for the world’s music producers to get access to the 
US – and other – markets (Cowan, 2002).  The remaining eight artists appearing on charts 
around the world are from a variety of countries of varying sizes: Nelly Furtado (Canada), Kylie 
Minogue (Australia), Las Ketchup (Spain), Shaggy (Jamaica), Shakira (Colombia), T.A.T.U. 
(Russia), Dido and Robbie Williams (United Kingdom).  So it’s possible that in a connected 
world, small-country artists could find new export audiences.  As the examples above suggest, 
globalization could either promote or diminish large-economy dominance in cultural products. 
 The debate matters for contemporary public policy.  Despite a general trend toward free 
trade negotiated under successive international agreements, cultural goods have had longstanding 
exceptions.  The first GATT agreement in 1947 allowed European countries to place import 
quotas on American films and, moreover, allowed European countries to undertake policies to 
“protect national treasures.”  At French insistence – and to Hollywood’s dismay – audiovisual 
products were allowed a “cultural exception” under the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), allowing European countries to maintain import 
quotas and subsidies to domestic cultural production.5  Europe’s commitment to policies 
promoting local culture has been reaffirmed by its 2006 ratification of the UNESCO Convention 
on Cultural Diversity, which seeks “to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions” 
and which reaffirms “the sovereign rights of States to maintain, adopt and implement policies 
and measures that they deem appropriate for the protection and promotion of the diversity of 
                                                            
4 Our definition of nationality is based on three criteria, in order: place of first recorded album, country of origin, 
and most popular in a given country.  Avril Lavigne, Enrique Iglesias, and Rihanna, for example, were born in 
Canada, Spain and Barbados, respectively, but recorded their first albums in the United States.  Our results are 
unchanged when using the country of origin as our unique measure of nationality. 
5 See Grasstek (2005) and Roger Cohen, “Europeans Back French Curbs on U.S. Movies,” New York Times, 
December 12, 1993. 
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cultural expressions on their territory.”6  Most European countries subsidize their domestic 
audiovisual sectors,7 and some regulate music as well.  Four countries in our sample – France, 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia – impose domestic radio airplay quotas to promote 
domestic musical artists. 
 There are large theoretical and empirical literatures on patterns of bilateral trade in 
goods.8  While scholars note the relative paucity of research on services – and have taken steps to 
correct it (see Reinsdorf and Slaughter, 2009) – lack of reliable data is a major obstacle, 
especially for cultural goods.  Few studies document trade in cultural services (see Disdier, et. al 
(2010) and Hanson and Xiang (2008)).9 
The goal of this project is to provide stylized facts about the patterns of trade and 
consumption of popular music since 1960.  We use novel data based on singles charts covering, 
for example, the weekly top 40 songs, from as many as 22 countries over past half century 
(Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US).  Music consumption in these 22 countries corresponded to 
over 98% of the recorded music market in 2003.10  The dataset includes 1,202,554 chart entries 
covering 68,283 songs and 23,377 artists.  By employing the national origin of each of the artists, 
we can determine the penetration of each national repertoire into each importing country.  In 
short, we can ask who buys whose music?  What roles do language and geography play in trade 
flows?  Because we observe a measure of sales of each repertoire in each market – and not just 
                                                            
6 See http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=33232&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html#I for a description of the terms of the 
UNESCO convention, accessed February 6, 2010. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/portal/action/diversity/unesco_en.htm, accessed February 6, 2010, for announcement of 
Europe’s ratification of the UNESCO convention. 
7 The Television without Frontiers directive, now called the Audiovisual Media Services Directive,   “requires 
broadcasters to reserve a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to news, 
sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and teleshopping, for European works.” See 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/promotion/index_en.htm.  
8  Krugman (1979), Anderson (1979), and Krugman (1980) provide prominent theoretical contributions. See, for 
example, Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) or Disdier and Head (2006) for introductions to empirics on trade and 
bilateral trade patterns in particular. 
9 Section II discusses the trade theory in more detail, in addition to the relevant empirical studies of trade in cultural 
goods. 
10 The recorded music industry generated roughly $34 billion in annual revenues in 2003, and according to the 
International Federation of the Phonograph Industry (IFPI) our sample of 22 countries accounted for $33.4 billion in 
revenues, or nearly all of the world’s recorded music revenue for that year. 
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international trade – we can also examine the extent of home bias in consumption of music.  
And, finally, how have all of these changed over time during a period when technological change 
has held the promise of making trade – particularly trade in digitally reproducible services – 
frictionless?   
Despite widespread fears about American dominance, we find that music trade is roughly 
proportional to countries’ GDPs and that several smaller countries, such as Sweden, have a larger 
proportional share of trade than the United States.  Trade in music bears some similarities to the 
trade of physical goods: shorter distances and sharing a common language promote higher trade 
volumes between countries, and those relationships have been relatively stable over the last 50 
years.  We also find a large bias toward domestic consumption of music which has, perhaps 
surprisingly, increased in the past two decades: the share of consumption worldwide that 
originates from domestic artists increased from less than 50% during the 1980’s to almost 70% 
in 2007.  This increased home bias is robust to a number of specifications, from descriptive 
analysis to gravity equations. 
What factors explain the increasing consumption of domestic music?  We first ask 
whether the lower trade costs resulting from new communication channels – such as MTV and 
the Internet – help displace local production and consumption of music.  We find that increased 
home bias is positively associated with the increase in local MTV channels and Internet 
penetration.  Second, we examine the role of protectionist policies to spur the popularity of 
locally produced music.  We document the importance of this mechanism by estimating the 
impact of quotas on domestic radio airplay on the share of domestic consumption. 
A few caveats accompany these results.  First, American music may indirectly affect the 
type or genre of music produced and consumed by other countries, i.e., French artists may 
produce rock & roll in France.  We explore this issue with a limited analysis of genre data.  
Second, smaller countries that have benefited the most from globalization, such as Sweden, may 
actually produce and export music in English – which is arguably not indigenously Swedish.  
Finally, while we cannot determine whether our results apply to developing countries such as 
China, India, and African countries, our data from Brazil show negligible effects of fifty years of 
globalization on its music trade and consumption patterns. 
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Overall, our estimates indicate that fears of cultural globalization seem misplaced, at least 
with respect to the music market.  Some smaller countries actually benefit substantially in this 
global market, as they are able to achieve market shares that are sometimes two or three times 
larger than the relative sizes of their economies.  Moreover, new technologies that lower trade 
costs do not appear to have a destructive effect on local production and consumption of music.  
Still, national policies that stimulate the production of local music appear effective in stimulating 
demand for domestic products. 
The paper proceeds in six sections after the introduction.  Section II reviews the literature 
and provides theoretical background that motivates the questions we ask.  Section III describes 
the data used in the study.  Section IV reports results, in three parts.  First, we offer descriptive 
characterization of national repertoires’ market shares, home bias, and the spatial pattern of 
contemporary music trade.  Second, we characterize changes in national market shares and trade 
patterns over the past half century.  Third, we examine these questions via empirical gravity 
models of the sort employed in the trade literature.  Section V then turns to a discussion of our 
results.  We present evidence supportive of the view that the recent growth in home bias is 
related to changes in technology, such as MTV and Internet, and also due to changes in national 
policy, such as the implementation of radio quotas.  Section VI presents additional robustness 
tests of our main estimates, and Section VII concludes the paper. 
 
II. Background 
II.a. Theory 
Music, along with other reproducible cultural products such as movies, is a differentiated 
product that is produced subject to increasing returns. The costs of recorded music, particularly 
as distribution technology has advanced, are almost entirely fixed.  The motivations for trade in 
such products are outlined in Krugman (1979): consumers like variety, and trade makes a wider 
variety of products available to consumers in each country.  Because of increasing returns, each 
variety is produced in only one country.  It is not clear which product gets produced where, but 
trade is balanced in the sense that the representative consumer’s product bundle has proportional 
representation from each producing country (according to the respective countries’ sizes).  This 
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simple model, with identical tastes and capabilities throughout the world gives rise to a simple 
frictionless gravity equation: artists from each country will have a world music market share 
equal to their countries’ share of the world economy/labor force. 
 The “gravity model,” in which trade between countries i and j is related to the market 
sizes of the two countries, can be derived from a variety of trade theories.  The starkest version 
of this model, adapting Anderson (1979) to our context, is 
(1) 
Y
YY
M jiij  , 
where Mij is the sales of repertoire from i in country j, Yi is the GDP of country i, and Y is the 
world GDP.  This version of the model has a single good, no transport costs, and identical 
preferences across all countries.  It can be restated, intuitively, to say that the market share of 
repertoire from country i among overall sales in country j equals country i’s share of the world 
economy: 
(2) ij i
j
M Y
Y Y

.
 
Although this “proportional” model is not meant as a realistic prediction, it does provide 
a benchmark for beginning the analysis.  The empirical literature on trade, discussed below, does 
so with an eye toward deviations from this simple proportional model due to supply factors, 
including trade costs associated with distance between countries, as well demand factors relating 
to differences in preferences across countries, including home bias in consumption, and effects 
of linguistic similarity on consumption. 
Industrial economics also provides a framework for thinking about possible dominance of 
the world market by large-market producers.  As Sutton (1991) argues, when product quality is 
determined by investments in fixed costs – as is clearly the case for media products – and when 
consumers agree on what constitutes quality, so that competition is vertical, then market 
enlargement need not lead to fragmentation.11  The opening of trade is a form of market 
enlargement, explicitly so if the tastes of the trading countries are identical.  With a larger 
                                                            
11 Berry and Waldfogel (forthcoming) draw on Sutton (1991) to interpret the relationship between market size and 
concentration in US newspaper markets. 
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market, a firm can profitably maintain market share by larger investments in quality, maintaining 
market share even as market size increases.  Thus when trade opens among a group of countries, 
it is possible that some artists or some national repertoires can invest in quality (for example 
through music videos or other promotional activity) and be more appealing to consumers around 
the world. 
While some features of media products – heavy reliance on fixed costs – correspond well 
to the Sutton setup, others may not.  First, while competition may indeed have some vertical 
aspects, it is also clear that music products are horizontally differentiated (think, for example, of 
different genres of popular music, including country, rap, and pop).  Moreover, different 
countries quite possibly have different taste distributions.  So while Sutton provides a way to 
organize thinking about how the worldwide availability of, say, Britney Spears could result in 
her domination of the world market for popular music, the framework also provides ways to 
rationalize continued fragmentation and continued attachment to domestic products in the face of 
globalization, or greater trade possibilities. 
The foregoing section serves to organize the descriptive analysis that follows, in which 
we seek to examine two questions: 
1) Who trades with whom in the popular music market?  Is trade proportional, as in 
frictionless gravity models, or do artists from particular countries play a disproportionate 
share? 
2) How have patterns of trade changed over the past half century as “transport costs” of 
various sorts (literal, based on cultural distance) have declined?  Has globalization promoted 
increased or decreased dominance by artists from large countries? 
II.b. Relevant Literatures 
This study is also directly related to three existing literatures in economics: 1) the (small) 
empirical literature on trade in cultural products, especially movies; 2) the empirical literature on 
the effect of distant media products on local behaviors; and 3) the normative theoretical literature 
on the desirability of free trade in cultural products.  We describe these in turn. 
9 
 
Despite the interest in cultural trade, there is relatively little empirical work in economics 
about the subject.  Cowan (2002), critical of naïve anti-globalizationists, provides anecdotal 
evidence that globalization allows promotion of small-country cultures.  Disdier et al (2010) 
estimate empirical gravity models on bilateral trade flows, 1988-2004, in cultural goods 
(including books, newspapers, recorded media, visual arts, and audio visual materials).  They 
find that distance reduces trade flows and that common language and colonial links raise trade. 
They rely on the UN’s COMTRADE database.  While perhaps the best data source available on 
trade in cultural products, it nevertheless has some shortcomings, such as incomplete coverage of 
transactions among subsidiaries of multinational corporations (see UNESCO, 2005).  Because of 
the shortcomings in conventional trade data, Hanson and Xiang (2008) use film industry sources 
to assemble a novel dataset covering foreign box office receipts for Hollywood movies, allowing 
them to calculate their own trade statistics.  They find that they are more popular in countries 
with similar languages and in countries with smaller economies.  US movies are less popular in 
countries that, all things equal, are further away.12  Blum and Goldfarb (2006) study US Internet 
users’ visits to foreign sites and document a surprisingly strong distance effect for information 
consumed digitally over the Internet.13   
Another relevant strand of work examines the effect of distant, as opposed to local, media 
products on behaviors.  Research in this vein includes Oster and Jensen’s (2007) work on the 
spread of cable television to remote regions of India and concomitant effects on treatment of 
local women, research on the effect of the spread of national newspapers on the targeting of local 
newspaper products (George and Waldfogel 2006), and work on the effect of local media 
products on voter turnout (Oberholzer, Gee, and Waldfogel 2009).  Disdier, Head and Mayer 
(2010) provide evidence that the introduction of foreign television in France causes substantial 
changes in baby naming, away from traditional French names such as Sebastien drawn from 
saint names and toward American names such as “Dylan” or “Brenda.”  This is evidence that 
trade in cultural products – in this case television programming – affects a symbolically 
important local behavior, how children are named. 
                                                            
12 See also Marvasti and Canterbery (2005). 
13 Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) find that bilateral scores in the Eurovision Song Contest, a measure of cross-
cultural affinity, are correlated with trade flows. 
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Finally, economists have recently developed theoretical models in which the effect of 
trade in cultural goods has ambiguous benefit.  Francois and Ypersele (2002) develop a model in 
which domestic consumers value both a global (“Hollywood”) and a local good.  Because of 
fixed costs, the local good can be driven out by trade, so depending on the distribution of tastes, 
it’s possible for a tariff on foreign movies to be welfare-improving.  Janeba (2003) also models 
network externalities for cultural goods, and finds that trade can be welfare improving if the 
world is culturally homogeneous but may not be if countries are culturally diverse.  Bala and 
Van Long (2005) develop an evolutionary model in which trade can cause the preferences of a 
large country to take over the preferences of a smaller country.  Such an effect can, in turn, 
justify restrictions on cultural imports into smaller countries. 
All of these models suggest potential problems with displacement of local products.  But 
the concerns they raise are relevant only if the products of some countries actually drive out the 
products of others, a question this paper seeks to address. 
 
III. Data 
The data for this study are based on chart entries from 22 countries, from 1960 through 
2007.  Charts are collected from disparate sources, so they differ in frequency and length 
(number of positions).  For many countries and years, we have weekly top 20 charts.  For others, 
we have the weekly top 100.  We have weekly charts for 10 of the countries over at least some 
years.  For two countries – Australia and Brazil – we have only annual top 100 charts.  The data 
include a total of 1,222,384 chart entries.14  We transform these sources of disparate lengths and 
                                                            
14 We obtained the chart data from a variety of online sources (links accessed on December 2009): Argentina - 
http://top40-charts.com/chart.php?cid=3; Austria - http://austriancharts.at/weekchart.asp?cat=s; Australia -  
http://www.austchartbook.com.au/; Belgium - http://www.ultratop.be/en/ultratop.asp; Brazil - 
http://www.hot100brasil.com/timemachinemain.html; Canada - 
http://www.1050chum.com/index_chumcharts.aspx?chart=1 and 
http://www.muchmusic.com/tv/countdown/index.aspx?CountdownDate=4/16/2009; Chile - http://www.top40-
charts.com; Denmark - http://www.dr.dk/p3/tjeklisten/; Finland - http://finnishcharts.com/index.asp; France - 
http://lescharts.com/weekchart.asp?cat=s ; Germany - http://ki.informatik.uni-
wuerzburg.de/~topsi/deutop20.html#thisyear; Italy - http://www.hitparadeitalia.it/hp_weeks/index.html; Japan - 
http://top40-charts.com/chart.php?cid=16; Netherlands - http://dutchcharts.nl/weekchart.asp?cat=s ; New Zealand - 
http://charts.org.nz/index.asp ; Norway - http://norwegiancharts.com/weekchart.asp?cat=s ; Portugal - http://top40-
charts.com/chart.php?cid=20; Spain - http://top40-charts.com/chart.php?cid=21; Sweden - 
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frequencies into comparable annual data.  Tables 2 and 3 describe the underlying data’s 
frequency (e.g. weekly or monthly) and the length of the periodic music charts. 
Although ours is a sample of convenience, we have tried to find multiple countries 
speaking each language (e.g. Brazil and Portugal; France and Belgium; Spain, Chile, and 
Argentina; Germany, Austria and Switzerland) so that we can distinguish effects of distance and 
common language on trade.  We have 10 countries continuously since the mid 1960s (or earlier): 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and US.  We have another 
four with data since at least the mid 1970s: Switzerland, Belgium, New Zealand, and Sweden.  
France’s chart data are available since 1984.  Our dataset picks up two more beginning in the 
mid-1990s: Denmark and Finland.  Finally, it expands by five countries beginning in the early 
2000s: Argentina, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and Chile.  Overall, countries included in our sample 
correspond to approximately 98% of the $34 billion in revenues raised with recorded music in 
2003.  Descriptive results and gravity equations presented in this paper are robust to the 
exclusion of countries that only appear in the sample after 1970 or 1980 (see sections III and V). 
To make the data usable, we first needed to clean the artist names so that they are the 
same in each country.  We accomplished this through tedious visual inspection.  We also needed 
to determine the nationality of each artist.  To this end we undertook a laborious process of 
searching various sources (including music encyclopedias, allmusic.com, and Wikipedia) to 
determine the nationality of each artist.  A nationality is defined in three possible ways, in order 
of importance: 1) the country of the first record; 2) the country of birth; 3) country where the 
artist was most popular.  Of the chart entries in our final sample, 34%, 48%, and 1% used criteria 
1, 2 and 3, respectively.15  This process allows us to attach nationalities to the vast majority 
(82%) of the artist entries appearing in the sample.  Additionally, we mechanically assign an 
artist’s nationality to his or her chart country if that is the only country in which an artist appears 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.swedishcharts.com/index.asp; Switzerland - http://hitparade.ch/index.asp; United Kingdom - 
http://www.chartstats.com/; United States - http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/index.jsp. 
15 For the sub-sample of entries with known country of first record and known country of origin, these two criteria 
have a similar nationality for 92% of the artists. 
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on the charts (15% of chart entries use this assignment).  We were unable to find or assign 
nationalities to the remaining 3% of entries.16 
 While we would like to observe sales, our data are instead ordered chart rankings.  These 
rankings are based largely on sales, although they are also based on part on radio airplay.17  
Although we could calculate national repertoire market shares based on, say, the share of US 
top-100 songs by artists from France, this approach is potentially misleading.  It is clearly not the 
case that a number-20 song contributes as much to sales as a number-one song.  We can improve 
on equal weighting by translating chart positions into indices based on some information about 
the distribution of sales.  There is by now an established empirical tradition of translating sales 
ranks into (pseudo) sales data, necessitated by the difficulty – which we share – of not observing 
sales quantities directly.  For example Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) and Brynjolffson, Hu, and 
Smith (BHS, 2003) find that sales of online books obey the “80-20 rule”18 and are well described 
by the Pareto distribution.  This can be described by a relationship between log sales and the log 
sales rank.  With fragmentary data on sales and ranks, the above authors have explored 
regressions of the form: logሺݏ݈ܽ݁ݏሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ logሺݎܽ݊݇ሻ ൅ ߳, where α and β are coefficients, and 
ε is an error term.  Chevalier and Goolsbee find a coefficient of -0.855 for books, while BHS 
report -0.871.  We follow this approach, converting ranks into sales indices, using β = -1.19  To 
this end we create a sales index that is the reciprocal of the sales ranking.  That is, if a song is 
number 5 on a national chart in a given week, we describe its sales as (1/5)th as high as the 
number-one song, and so on. 
 In addition to giving differently-ranked songs more appropriate roles in sales, the use of 
this index also helps to deal with charts of different length and frequency across time and place.  
                                                            
16 In this version of the paper we only used the nationality of the first artist listed in a chart.  About 9% of the charts 
have at least two artists, and these two artists have identical nationality in 70% of the cases. 
17 Chart methodologies have changed over time with the changing role of singles.  Since 1991, the Billboard Hot 
100 chart has relied on a combination of sales data from Soundscan (which mechanically monitors music sales) and 
radio airplay data from Broadcast Data Services (which mechanically monitors airplay) rather than manual reports 
from radio stations and record stores. Prior to September 1995, songs could enter the chart based on airplay alone; 
afterwards, entering the chart required both airplay and sales.  In December 1998 the methodology changed to allow 
songs to enter the chart based on airplay alone, allowing songs never released as singles to enter the chart. Beginning 
in 2005, Billboard allowed paid digital downloads to enter the chart regardless of airplay. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billboard_charts#Methodology_of_its_charts, accessed February 9, 2010 
18 That is, 20 percent of the products account for 80 percent of total sales. 
19 We were able to collect weekly data on recent rankings and actual sales of records for South Korea from 2001 to 
2008 from the Music Industry Association of Korea in order to test such prediction.  We estimated β coefficients 
that ranged from -.9 to -1.1, and our preferred data and specification resulted in a coefficient of -1.03. 
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For example, we have top-20 weekly charts for many of our country-years and top-50 weekly 
charts for others.  If sales follow this rule, then the top 20 account for 69 percent of the sales of 
the top 100, and the top 50 account for  87 percent of the sales of the top 100 in that week.  
Whatever the underlying (weekly or monthly, etc.) chart lengths, we aggregate each artist’s sales 
index in a chart country to the annual level, creating an annual sales index.  Each country-year 
has at least 100 entries, so the Pareto distribution implies that a very small share of sales is 
omitted in our calculation of market shares.  We explore the effects of different weighting 
schemes in section VI, and find that our main results do not depend on our choice of a particular 
weighting scheme. 
 While this translation of rank into a sales index gives us a method for calculating, say, the 
market share of French artists in Belgium, we also want to calculate the share of French artists in 
the world market (which, for us, is the sample countries).  This calculation requires measures of 
market size – total music sales – in each of the sample countries.  For years since 2003 we have 
direct measures of music sales in the sample countries, from the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI).  We have national GDP (from the Penn World Tables) back to the 
beginning of the sample.  Appendix Table 1 shows IFPI and GDP shares for all countries in our 
sample in 2003.  With the exception of Japan and England (with higher shares of music 
consumption than GDP shares) and Brazil (with lower share of music consumption than GDP 
share), all other countries in our sample have music consumption shares similar to GDP shares.  
We also run a regression of log IFPI on log GDP for the countries in our sample from 2003 to 
2007 to gauge the relationship between both measures.  The estimated coefficient of log GDP is 
0.97 with standard error 0.054. 
In practice, if ݏ௜ிis the French artist market share in country i, and mi is the size of the 
music market in country i – which we operationalize as either IFPI music sales or GDP – then 
the world market share for French repertoire is: 
(3)  ݏி ൌ ∑ ௦೔ಷ೔ಿ ௠೔∑ ௠೔೔ಿ ,  
where we have omitted time subscripts.     
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IV. Empirical Results  
 Our empirical inquiry proceeds in three steps.  First, we descriptively examine patterns of 
contemporary trade in music.  Second, we ask how these patterns have changed over the past half 
century.  Third, we turn to regression models, such as gravity equations, to document these 
relationships more systematically, and in ways that simultaneously control for a variety of 
factors. 
IV.a. Contemporary Trade in Music 
i. World Sales, Trade Shares and Proportionality 
Proportionality provides a benchmark for characterizing trade in music.  Under the strict 
proportionality view – which would prevail if countries differed in size but had identical 
preferences and tendencies to supply music and if trade costs were zero – each repertoire would 
have the same market share in each country market.  That is, the French music market share 
would be the same in France and in Belgium; furthermore, it would equal the French share of 
world GDP.  Moreover, each repertoire’s share of world trade would equal its share of world 
sales. 
Table 4 provides a first glimpse at sales and trade data, with a comparison of each 
national repertoire’s share of trade and world consumption (which includes domestic sales of 
local artists) compared with the respective countries’ shares of “world” GDP.20  Because of 
measures of sales fluctuate somewhat year to year, we use a five-year period for our 
characterization of contemporary patterns.  In particular, we choose the most recent 5-year 
period for which we have sales data for all countries (2003-2007).  The first column shows each 
country’s share of sample countries’ GDP, while the second column shows each national 
repertoire’s share of world sales, and the third column shows each repertoire’s share of world 
trade.  For example, the second row of the table shows that while Australia has 2.2 percent of 
world GDP, its artists garner 0.6 percent of world sales.  Australian music makes up 1.2 percent 
                                                            
20 Our sample of countries accounts for almost the totality of music revenues in the world, but it only accounts for 
48% of the world GDP (as of 2003). To make the GDP-shares, music-shares comparisons more appropriate, we 
assume that “world” GDP shares are based on the total world GDP of the 22 countries in the sample. 
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of world music trade.  The United States leads the world consumption and trade of music – 52% 
and 48% respectively - but it also has the largest share of GDP – 39%. 
To better visualize the discrepancies between sales and GDP shares, Figures 1 and 2 
depict the respective relationships between log GDP shares and the repertoires’ log world sales 
shares and log trade shares graphically.  In each figure the solid line represents proportionality: 
the line is upward sloping because the repertoires of larger countries would be expected to 
occupy larger shares of total sales or trade.  Both scatters of points are upward-sloping, 
confirming that the repertoires of larger countries tend to have larger sales and trade shares.  In 
the world sales figure, four repertoires – from the US, UK, Japan, and Sweden – are 
disproportionately large and lie above the proportionality line.  Many repertoires lie below the 
line.  Three – for Portugal, Chile, and Argentina – lie far below the line. 
The scatter for trade in Figure 2 remains upward-sloping, confirming that repertoires 
from bigger countries occupy a larger share of trade as well as world sales, as proportionality 
would imply.  The biggest difference between the total sales and trade figures is Japan’s position.  
While Japanese music has a large world market share due to its home sales, it makes up a small 
share of trade with the other sample countries.21  In contrast, the musical repertoires of Sweden, 
New Zealand, and Canada occupy much larger shares of trade than sales. 
While the points are not literally on the line, proportionality is not a bad first 
approximation.22  Using the consumption data, the repertoire with the most disproportionately 
large share – Sweden – has a sales share that is 59 percent above its country’s world GDP share.  
The UK is 52 percent above proportionality with GDP, and the US is 33 percent above.  Looking 
only at trade, six countries have disproportionately large shares of world trade: Sweden (3.2 
times GDP), Canada (2.2), Finland (2), UK (1.9), New Zealand (1.4), and the US (1.2).  With the 
exception of the UK and the US, these are not particularly large countries.  The US is by far the 
largest, and while it does have a disproportionate share of trade, its share is only 24 percent 
above its GDP share. 
                                                            
21 This difference is presumed exaggerated by our sample’s inclusion of no other Asian countries.  But the bias is 
likely to be small because of regional differences in language and culture, and because other countries in Asia 
represent a very small fraction of the world sales. 
22 Regression models do not reject proportionality at 5% significance: a linear regression of log sales shares on log 
GDP shares estimates a correlation of 0.61 (s.e. 0.38), while a linear regression of log trade shares on log GDP 
shares has a correlation of 1.31 (s.e. 0.25). 
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This leads to our first empirical observation: despite widespread concern about large-
country dominance of markets for cultural goods, country repertoires’ shares are roughly 
proportionate to their sizes, and the US has neither the most disproportionate share of total 
consumption nor trade. 
ii. Home Market Bias? 
 The deviation between repertoire shares of world trade and world sales reflects a 
deviation from proportionality and, in particular, possible bias in favor of domestic products.  
The last column of Table 4 presents each country’s domestic share (e.g. the American artists’ 
market share in the US).  Under proportionality, the domestic shares would equal each country’s 
GDP shares.  Thus, the domestic shares would be larger for larger countries.  Indeed, US and 
Japan have the largest domestic shares (89.9% and 86.6%).  Figure 3 depicts this relationship for 
all countries.  The scatter is clearly upward-sloping, confirming that larger countries repertoires 
have higher domestic sales shares.  However, every country’s domestic share vastly exceeds its 
GDP share.23 
The repertoires furthest off the proportionality line – with the highest domestic shares 
relative to their roles in world GDP – include New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries.  
Their domestic shares average nearly 50 times their shares of world GDP.  The countries with 
the smallest proportional home bias include the US (domestic share 2.3 times its world GDP 
share), Germany (4.4), and Australia (6). 
Home bias is by no means unique to our cultural good context: Wei (1996) documents 
that an average OECD country “imported” about 2.5 times as much from itself as from an 
otherwise similar foreign country.  Still, the contemporary evidence on home bias in popular 
music shows a striking deviation from proportionality reflecting a strong preference for domestic 
repertoires. 
 iii. Who Trades with Whom? 
                                                            
23 Home bias has received substantial attention in the empirical trade literature.  See, for example, Holger C. Wolf 
(2000), or John McCallum (1995).  
17 
 
Although home bias leads to a clear deviation from proportionality in sales figures, it is 
still possible that proportionality would hold among the products traded across borders for each 
country.  To explore this, we calculate each repertoire’s share of imports in each country where it 
is sold.  Figure 4 depicts these as bar charts showing each repertoire’s share of imports in other 
countries.  (For example, the upper left picture shows Australian music’s share of imports into 
each destination country).  Under proportionality of trade, the bars for each exporter would be of 
equal height everywhere they are imported.  For example, French music would make up the 
same share of imports in both the US and Belgium. 
 A glance at Figure 4, which depicts the import shares in descending order, shows that 
such proportionality does not hold for trade.  The bars for each repertoire are not of equal height.  
For most repertoires, their height declines quickly when ordered from largest to smallest.  For 
example, the upper left panel shows Australian music’s share in the markets where it makes up 
the largest share of imports.  These are, in order, New Zealand, the UK, and Canada.  Australian 
music makes up 4 percent of imports in New Zealand, but less than 3 percent in the UK and 
Canada.  Other drop-offs are similarly quick:  Canadian music makes up a third of US imports 
but less than a tenth of imports in the next country.   
While all drop-offs are clear, three occur more slowly than others: the US, UK, and 
Sweden (depicted in the last three panels of Figure 4).  US repertoire makes up over 80 percent 
of imports in Canada and Australia.  US repertoire makes up over 40 percent in 16 of 22 
countries and over a quarter in all sample countries. 
Examining these panels gives a sense of the importance of two central factors in the 
empirical literature on trade in goods, geographic proximity and linguistic similarity of trading 
partners.  Brazil’s repertoire has its largest trade share in Portugal, the only other Portuguese-
speaking country in the sample.  France has large import shares in Belgium and Switzerland 
(which are nearby and partly Francophone).  Germany has large shares in other German-
speaking countries: Austria and Switzerland as well as other nearby countries, including the 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries.  As noted above, American and Canadian repertoires 
are especially popular in Canada and the US, respectively, which share both a language and a 
border.  Spain has its most substantial trade shares in Spanish-speaking Chile and Argentina, as 
well as geographically adjacent Portugal.  We will directly estimate the importance of both 
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geography and languages in the gravity equations in Section III.3.  Before that, however, we 
descriptively examine the historic patterns in music consumption and trade. 
IV.b. A Half Century of Popular Music Trade 
 How have national repertoires’ shares of world consumption, or world trade, evolved 
over the past 50 years?  Figure 5 provides a first pass at this question, with each country’s share 
of the world market since 1960.  Because we have only recent IFPI music sales data, we 
calculate trade figures using our rank data in conjunction with GDP data.  The figure includes 16 
countries with continuous data since 1984, to guarantee that composition effects are not driving 
recent results (although similar patterns are observed for the complete sample).  Only two 
country shares, the US and the UK, are clearly visible.  A striking pattern in this figure is what 
one might term, “the rise and fall of the British empire”: The UK repertoire share rises from 
about 10 percent in 1960 to a peak of over 30 percent in the 1960s (the “British invasion”).  The 
UK share fell to 20 percent in 1970, then rose to a peak of roughly a third of the world market in 
the mid-1980s (the “Second British invasion”).  The UK share has fallen steadily since.  Music 
from the US takes up the largest share of the world market, but its share fell from nearly 80 
percent in 1960 to a low of 40 percent in the mid-1980s.  Since then, the US share has risen fairly 
steadily to its current level of nearly 60 percent.  Because other economies tend to be small 
relative to the UK and, especially, the US, their consumption shares are small. 
 As we saw in the contemporary evidence, repertoire shares of large economies tend to be 
large simply because of the size of the economies.  Figure 6 reports the consumption shares 
divided by GDP shares.  Under proportionality, countries’ indices would hover near one and 
would not vary much over time.  In this figure, the US index is close to its proportional share, 
while the UK index has, for most of the period, been the highest.  In the mid-1980s the UK 
repertoire’s market share was over four times its share of GDP.  At times, other repertoires have 
had disproportionate shares: Australia’s ratio reached 3 in the late 1970s, and Sweden’s ratio 
passed 3 in the early 1990s.  Canada’s ratio passed 1.5 in the late 1990s.  All other countries 
show ratios below one. 
 As we saw in contemporary data, home bias causes world market shares to deviate from 
trade shares.  For example, because the US and Japan are large markets, their consumption of 
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domestic artists swells their national repertoires’ shares of world sales.  Concerns about 
globalization are arguably better documented with national repertoires’ share of trade, as 
opposed to total sales.  Figure 7 does this, showing that for most of the period – between the mid 
1960s and 1990 – UK repertoire had the highest share of world trade, around 40 percent.  The 
UK share has declined steadily since 1990, and the US share, roughly a third for most of the 
period, has surpassed the UK share, reaching about 40 percent in the past 15 years. 
 Relative to GDP, the national repertoires that have occupied disproportionate shares of 
world trade over the sample period are those of the UK, Sweden, Canada, and Australia.  While 
the US index of trade has risen over the sample period, it has been below its proportional share 
the entire time.  Except in the early 1960s, the US index has always been below the UK index, 
usually far below (see Figure 8).24 
Despite policymaker and popular concern over US dominance, Figures 5-8 show that 
increased consumer access to foreign products over the past half century has not brought about a 
trend systematically favoring the US repertoire, or those of large economies generally, relative to 
smaller economies.  Moreover, despite popular fears, the US is not the most disproportionately 
dominant supplier to the world’s popular music market.  The contemporary data provided 
evidence of a bias in favor of domestic music in every sample country.  Figure 9 summarizes 
worldwide home bias over time (with the share of consumption worldwide that is domestic 
artists).  This “overall home share” fell steadily from the early 1960s until the mid-1980s.  As of 
the mid-1980s – a few years after the introduction of a single worldwide MTV – it appeared that 
consumers around the world were losing interest in their domestic artists.  One might at the time 
have viewed this as a symptom that preferences were converging across the world.  However, the 
overall home share has rebounded steadily since the mid-1980s, reversing what might have 
appeared ominous in 1985.25 
                                                            
24 Figures 6 and 8 are normalized by GDP that also changes over time.  In Appendix Figure 1 we normalize export 
shares by a constant IFPI from 2003.  These figures are almost identical to Figure 8, indicating that actual sales are 
the main source of variation of exports over time. 
25 One caveat about growing home shares in the past two decades is that ranking methodologies could also be 
influencing our results.  As described in Section II, Billboard charts are a function of sales of singles, albums, videos 
and DVDs, with weights for these items changing over time.  For example, the US Billboard charts have given more 
weight towards radio airplay time since 1998.  Additionally, starting in 2005, sales of digital music are also part of 
the ranking equation.  Our data reveals, however, that such events did not dramatically change the levels of home 
consumption shares in the United States.  The data is more consistent with a growing trend in home bias that started 
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Figure 10 shows each country separately.  While home shares have declined in the UK 
over the past quarter century, they have risen in many other countries – including the US, 
Sweden, Brazil, France – over the past 20 years, producing the overall increase in the home 
share.  The rising home shares outside the UK correspond to the decline of the British 
repertoire’s market share. 
The descriptive analysis presented above could be confounded by factors not directly 
modeled in those figures and tables, such as distance and language effects, and other country of 
origin or country of destination specific effects.  We now turn to estimating the home bias, 
language, and distance effects in the context of the gravity model in order to separate and control 
for those specific factors. 
IV.c. Gravity Equation Evidence  
 We can characterize the trade data parsimoniously – and in accordance with common 
empirical practice in trade – using a gravity equation (see Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995 and 
Disdier and Head, 2010).  Generically speaking, these are regressions of the log of the trade flow 
between countries i and j on measures of the sizes of the source and destination economies, as 
well as the distance between the two countries and measures of cultural similarity such as 
whether they speak a common language.26  Because we have data on both trade flows and 
domestic consumption, we can treat “domestic imports” as another observation and include a 
variable for domestic consumption, providing an estimate of home bias. 
 A few additional comments are in order.  First, we follow the practice of including source 
and origin fixed effects rather than measures of economy size (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003).  Second, measuring home bias requires a measure of the distance travelled by domestic 
consumption.  As Wolf (2000) points out, the literature has not converged on an agreed-upon 
method for doing this, so we try a variety of approaches.  A first approach is to treat internal 
imports as travelling 1 km, so that log distance is zero for domestic imports.  This approach 
understates domestic distance and will therefore understate the extent of home bias.  Second, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
in 1985 and that has not stopped since.  Of course, this does not imply new technologies do not influence home bias 
– in Section IV we will in fact estimate their importance to domestic shares. 
26 We obtain data on distance and language from 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/tradedata.html#Gravity, accessed 
February 9, 2009. 
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define domestic distances to be the somewhat arbitrary 100 or 500 kilometers.  Finally, following 
Wolf (2000), we define the domestic distance as half the distance to each country’s nearest 
country in the sample. 
We begin by using annual data, 2003-2007, based on IFPI sales.  An observation is the 
volume of imports from each national repertoire to each country by year.  Thus – suppressing 
time subscripts – we estimate equations of the form: 
(4) ln൫ݐݎܽ݀݁௜௝൯ ൌ ߙ ln൫݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௝൯ ൅ ߚሺݏܽ݉݁ ݈ܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁ሻ௜௝ ൅ ߜሺ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿሻ௜௝ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝, 
where ln(tradeij) is the log of trade from country i to country j during a year, ln(distanceij) is the 
log of distance (in km) between countries, (same language)ij is an indicator which is 1 if both 
countries speak the same language, (domestic)ij is an indicator which is 1 for domestic 
consumption (when i=j), µi and µj are origin and destination fixed effects, and εij is an error.  We 
estimate the model on annual data, and we cluster errors on country pairs to deal with non-
independence of observations across years. 
Table 5 reports results.  The first column includes only trade (excluding domestic 
consumption).  The distance coefficient is -0.42, indicating that a one percent increase in 
distance between trading partners reduces music trade by 0.42 percent.  Trade is substantially 
higher if the trading partners share a language: the coefficient is 0.85 in log terms.  The 
remainder of table also includes domestic consumption, allowing for measurement of home bias.  
In column (2) internal distance is 1 km, and the home bias is small and insignificant, while the 
distance coefficient remains close to -0.4, and the same-language coefficient remains close to 1.  
When the internal distance is measured in the other proposed ways, the home bias becomes 
large, with a log coefficient between 2 and 2.5.  (That is, the domestic share is about three times 
higher than would be expected under proportionality).  The distance coefficient remains about  
-0.4, and the same-language coefficient remains roughly 1.  Column 6 repeats the latter 
regression using the GDP-based import measure for the same time period, with very similar 
results.  This is reassuring given that we rely on the GDP-based measures for the comparisons 
we make over time.  
 The appearance of a distance effect for recorded music 2003-2007 is interesting given the 
small trade costs associated with recorded music since 2003.  Relative to manufactured goods, 
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recorded music has always had smaller trade costs.  As music has become a digital product in the 
most recent decade, traditional trade costs have declined even further.   
 In a meta analysis of 1467 distance coefficients from 103 studies of goods trade, Disdier 
and Head (2010) find an average of 0.9 (“with 90 percent of estimates lying between 0.28 and 
1.55”).  Distance thus matters less with music than with typical goods, which is what one might 
expect given the small transport costs of recorded music.  That said, literal transport costs 
provide only one of a number of possible interpretations of distance coefficients.  Blum and 
Goldfarb (2006) find a distance coefficient of 1.1 for information consumed digitally over the 
Internet.  Because transport costs are literally – or virtually – zero in their context, it seems that 
transport costs for cultural goods might well reflect demand (preferences for proximate 
products), rather than supply (transport costs).  A similar interpretation may hold for the distance 
coefficient in our context. 
Using the GDP-based import measures, we can estimate the gravity model on data back 
to 1960.  We first estimate separate models for each decade, in Table 6.  We use half the distance 
to the nearest country as home market distance in this table’s regressions.  The comparison 
across decades reveals some interesting patterns.  First, while the distance effect was small in the 
1960s, it has been larger and stable since, even as trade costs of various sorts have declined.  
Second, the same-language preference has remained roughly constant over time.  Finally, the 
extent of home bias has risen sharply in the last decade. 
We can document this more flexibly by pooling all years’ data and interacting the home 
dummy with a dummy for every year in the sample.27  Figure 11 shows the evolution of the 
average extent of home bias over time.  The home bias was between 2 and 3 in the 1960’s 
(indicating that domestic music had an average domestic share about exp(2) and exp(3) times 
higher than otherwise similar foreign music), and the effect drops to approximately 1 during the 
1970’s and 1980’s.  Since the late 1990s, the home bias coefficient has risen steadily to 3, 
indicating a home bias of about exp(3).28  This time pattern matches the path of the overall home 
shares shown in Figure 9.  The 95% confidence intervals for each point estimate presented in the 
                                                            
27 We also interact year with same language, and year with distance in the same equation, in addition to including 
fixed effects for year, and country of origin and destination. 
28 Our finding of a growing home share accords with recent trends documented elsewhere.  According to European 
Commission (2003), “Recordings by domestic artists have risen from 58% to 68% of sales between 1991and 2001.” 
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same figure also show that some of the recent estimates of the home bias effects are statistically 
distinguishable from the trough of the home bias effect observed in the 1980’s.  For comparison 
purposes, we also plot yearly point estimates for same language and distance effects in Appendix 
Figure 2.  Interestingly, those effects are somewhat constant over those five decades. 
 
V.  Possible Explanations for the Increasing Home Bias 
It seems ironic that the world’s consumers have become more interested in their domestic 
music even as they have become better able to gain access to the world’s music.  In this section 
we investigate the role of recent audiovisual policies and of the spread of new technologies on 
the rising home bias.  We consider three factors as possible explanations of the growing home 
bias in the music market: the appearance of regional and country-specific music television, the 
growth of the Internet, and domestic airplay quotas. 
V.a. Mechanisms 
Prior to 1980 the main way that consumers became aware of music was through radio 
airplay.  Beginning in 1981 MTV broadcast music videos over cable television in the US.  While 
MTV was not allowed to operate in Canada, a Canadian firm launched a Canadian music 
television station, CHUM MuchMusic, in 1984.  But for roughly half a decade, there was only 
one MTV station throughout the world, which would seem to provide a force favoring a 
convergence of musical consumption across the globe.  Moreover, it would tend to promote 
whichever repertoire was being broadcast.  And indeed, the early years of MTV correspond to 
the period when the UK repertoire gained substantial market share throughout the world. 
However, beginning in 1987, MTV began to splinter regionally, creating region or 
country-specific channels carrying some local programming (and local music).  In 1987 MTV 
Europe was launched, broadcasting common programming throughout Europe in English.  Since 
then, MTV has increasingly customized programming to particular countries.29  Each of these 
                                                            
29  MTV Brasil launched in 1990.  MTV Japan launched in 1992.  The year 1995 saw the launch of MTV 
Netherlands.  In 1997, MTV launched MTV Central, serving German-speaking countries of Europe – Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein – in German.  MTV Argentina launched in 1999.  The network also 
launched MTV Italy, in Italian, MTV Australia, and MTV One for the UK (in English).  MTV launched MTV 
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channels was locally tailored in terms of both language and carriage of local artists.30  Figure 12 
shows the number of country-targeted MTV channels (for the countries in our sample) over time.  
While MTV may have begun as a force favoring convergence in music consumption across the 
globe, by the year 2000 MTV appeared to be a force promoting local as well as global artists. 
Since the late 1990s – when consumers began sharing music illegally on the Internet – 
the web has supplemented the role played by traditional media (radio and television) in musical 
discovery.  It is not clear how the web would affect trade.  On one hand, the web makes music of 
each country available to consumers both at home and abroad, which would tend to raise trade 
without necessarily reducing the world shares of any particular countries.  On the other hand, it is 
possible that the web reinforces local distribution.  Web distribution may complement the local 
promotion of concerts, in which case it would tend to promote domestic consumption more than 
trade.  These arguments are familiar from the debate over whether the Internet provides a 
complement or a substitute for physical agglomeration.  Evidence in Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) 
and Sinai and Waldfogel (2004) suggest that communication technology (including the Internet) 
is, on balance, a complement for agglomeration.  Figure 13 shows the time pattern of Internet 
adoption in our sample countries.31  Internet penetration grew rapidly from 1995 to about 2005, 
when it ranged from around 20 percent (in sample South American countries) to around 80 
percent (in the sample’s Scandinavian countries). 
The promotion of domestic musical artists is of sufficient importance that many countries 
mandate their carriage on domestic radio.  Since 1971 Canada has mandated that a certain share 
– now 35 percent – of music be of Canadian origin32.  Since 1996, France has required 40 
percent of music on the radio to be French.  Australia and New Zealand also require domestic 
content.33  Figure 14 documents the time pattern of the mandated domestic shares in Australia, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
France and MTV Spain in 2000, along with English-language MTV Nordic for Scandinavia.  MTV Chile launched 
in 2001. MTV launched MTV Portugal in 2003.  In 2005, MTV launched separate channels for Norway (MTV 
Norge), Finland, Denmark, and Sweden (MTV Sverige) in their respective languages.  In 2006 Austria and New 
Zealand got their own flavors of MTV.  In 2009 MTV Switzerland appeared. 
30 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_MTV_channels and the pages linked for information on the launch of 
local MTV channels (accessed January 26, 2010). 
31 See World Bank site http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport for internet 
data, accessed in January 2010. 
32 See http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/rpm/028020-200-e.html , accessed January 21, 2010. 
33 See http://www.mca.org.au/web/content/view/104/6), Bernier (2003), and Scott (2008) for evidence on the timing 
of these quotas.  Richardson (2008) provides a theoretical treatment. 
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France, Canada and New Zealand along with the domestic music shares in the respective 
countries. Particularly in Canada, New Zealand, and France, the imposition of the domestic 
quota coincides with a growth in domestic share. 
V.b. Empirical Evidence 
All of these factors – the presence of a local or a regional MTV station, the domestic 
adoption of the Internet, and the presence of domestic radio quotas – may explain the growing 
home bias.  To explore this, we regress the log home share for each country in each year on time 
dummies, country dummies, and dummies for music television, as well as measures of Internet 
penetration and quotas.  Results are shown in Table 7. 
All three groups of variables have positive coefficients.  Domestic radio quota and 
Internet penetration are statistically significant.  The coefficient of 1.49 on the quota variable 
means that an increase from 0 to 0.4 (the French case) would raise the domestic sales share by 
about 0.6 log points.  The Internet coefficient of 1.29 means that a movement from 0 to 100 
percent Internet penetration at home would raise the domestic music share by 1.29 log points 
(roughly doubling it).  The MTV coefficients are also positive but rather imprecisely estimated. 
To test the validity of those results, we also estimate two falsification tests.  First, we test 
whether those channels affected a different cultural product – movies.  Second, we estimate 
whether the three mechanisms affect home bias five years prior to the relevant time period where 
we should observe an effect of MTV or Internet penetration.  Columns 6 and 7 of Table 7 
respectively report these estimates.  While the three mechanisms have positive and generally 
significant coefficients in music equations, they enter the movie equations insignificantly (and 
with negative coefficients).34  However, the timing falsification test on column 7 casts a doubt on 
the potential causality of the results for MTV and Internet, while it still corroborates the effect of 
domestic radio quotas on the growing home bias.  Even though we do not have a randomized 
experiment to estimate the causal impact of these new communication technologies on music 
                                                            
34 Film data are drawn from European Commission (2003).  The film data include the national box office revenue 
and shares of box office receipts in up to 30 European countries (as well as the US and Japan) for films from each of 
the US, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.  The data also include the share of receipts for domestic films 
from each sample country.  The data are available for 1980, 1985, 1990, and then annually, 1995 -2001.  
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consumption, we can at least infer from our regression estimates that they did not diminish the 
viability of domestic music.  Moreover, protectionist policies aimed at increasing the domestic 
consumption of culture goods may have produced their expected result. 
While it is off our main point, it is nevertheless interesting to explore whether the quota-
increased domestic shares translate into high shares abroad.  If radio airplay stimulates sales, 
then it’s not surprising to see that the French repertoire share increases with the French domestic 
quotas.  But how about the French repertoire share abroad?  If the quotas promote airplay of 
music that cannot meet a market test, the music should not fare well in countries where it is not 
promoted by quotas.  Figure 15 shows the French share in France, as well as its major music 
trading partners, Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland.  Visual inspection suggests, perhaps 
counterintuitively, that protected French repertoire passes a market test abroad, particularly in 
Belgium.35 
 
VI. Robustness Tests 
VI.a. Pareto Distributed “Sales” vs. Equal-Weighted Chart Entries 
Our “sales” data derived from ranks place higher weights on chart-topping artists and 
therefore give a larger world consumption or trade market shares to repertoires that appear in, 
say, the top 10 on country charts.  It is possible that some national repertoire shares vary between 
the top of the charts and the remainder.  Our basic sales measure would understate the role of a 
repertoire appearing disproportionately in the “basement” of country charts. 
To explore this we analyze an alternative measure that weights all entries equally, a 
national repertoire’s share of chart entries among, say, the top 50 chart entries for each country.  
Table 8 shows each repertoire’s share among entries among sample country charts and, within 
country, across ranges of chart positions for the period 2003-2007.  The table shows, for 
                                                            
35 We can explore this more systematically with a  regression of log repertoire shares in destination countries on year 
dummies, origin-destination fixed effects and dummies for both domestically protected repertoire (whether at home 
or abroad) and domestically protected repertoire in its protected home market.  This regression yields a coefficient 
of 0.39 (with a standard error of 0.11) on protected repertoire, and an additional 0.36 (0.29) on protected repertoire 
at home.  That is, following the imposition of domestic protection, a protected repertoire increases its share by a 
statistically and economically significant 39 percent in foreign markets.  Its increase in share at home is even larger 
but not statistically significantly so. 
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example, that chart entries for US repertoire made up roughly a third of total chart entries in 
sample countries’ annual top 50s.  Interestingly, the US share is virtually identical for the top and 
bottom of the charts.  Most repertoires have similar shares among top 10 and lower-ranked 
entries.  The UK is an exception.  UK repertoire makes up 8 percent of the top 10 and almost 20 
percent of the entries outside the top 50.  The general similarity of repertoire shares among top 
10 and lower ranges indicates that our basic measure’s heavier weighting of highly ranked 
entries does not exert an important influence on the results. 
Equal weighting among the country top 50 charts also allows us to calculate a simple 
overlap measure of chart convergence.  We calculate this as the ratio of the number of distinct 
artists appearing on any charts in a year, divided by the number of chart entries in the year 
(essentially the number of included countries times 50).  Figure 16 illustrates this.  The index 
declines from 1960 through the mid-1980s, as the world charts come to include fewer distinct 
artists per chart entry.  Since the mid-1980s the index has risen steadily as world charts have 
featured more distinct artists per entry.36  This divergence has two causes.  First, it reflects the 
waning of the second British Invasion of the 1980s documented above.  Second, it reflects the 
growth in attention to home-country artists in the past decade, also documented above. 
VI.b. Zero Gravity Issues 
Our study faces a common challenge for gravity equations, the treatment of country pairs 
observed not trading in a given year.  Omitting these observations from the sample will give rise 
to biased estimates of the distance parameter if, as is plausible, observing no trade is caused by 
factors similar to those that would cause little trade.  For our purpose we are less concerned with 
bias at a point in time than with possible changes in the bias from ignoring zeroes over time.  
One simple strategy for dealing with the zeroes is to set the zero trade observations equal to 
some low value, for example the minimum import observation observed for the country (from 
any exporter), on the view that the true value of imports is not zero but is not observed because it 
falls below, say, the threshold needed to appear among the importing country’s top 100.  Of 
                                                            
36 Because the number of countries included increases over time, the first figure is potentially affected by sample 
composition.  We examined this by creating separate figures for different sets of countries: 1) the 7 with chart data 
since 1960, 2) the 9 with data since 1965, 3) the 13 with data since 1975, 4) the 15 with data since 1984, and 5) the 
22 with data since 2001.  Each of these shows the chart convergence in the mid-1980s followed by divergence since.  
These figures are available upon request. 
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course, other corrections are possible, for example limited dependent variable techniques37.  As a 
rough pass at the problem, Panel A of Table 9 reports gravity equations by decade (as in Table 
6), replacing the formerly missing trade data with the minimum value of imports for each 
importer.  The levels of various estimated parameters change: distance parameters become 
substantially more negative, indicating that pairs of countries with no observable trade are more 
like to be distant from each other.  Similarly, the home bias grows larger.  Of greatest interest to 
us, the level of home bias rises sharply in the 1990s and the 2000s, as before. 
VI.c. Changing Country Coverage over Time 
Because the changing home bias over time is our main result, one might be concerned 
that it arises spuriously because of the growth in country coverage over time.  To explore this, 
we re-estimate the gravity equations, by decade, from Table 6, including only destination 
countries that have been in the sample since at least 1970.  Panel B of Table 10 shows that 
substantive results continue to hold.  In particular, the extent of home bias grows substantially in 
the past decade. 
VI.d. Genre 
While our results thus far show that US artists do not disproportionately dominate the 
world popular music market, the US could still be spreading its culture if artists elsewhere copy 
American music styles.  We could explore this if we had data on the genre of each artist along 
with information on the national origin of each genre.  Then, for example, if the spread of an 
indigenous American genre such as rap could reflect US dominance even if the rap sold were by, 
say, French or German artists.  To explore this, we obtained data on the genre for every CD 
available for sale in the US between 1985 and 2002 from MUZE, a service providing catalog 
data to music retailers.  Some of the categories of genre in the data set include pop & rock, R&B, 
electronic, country, gospel, reggae, spoken word, oldies, and international.38  Figure 17 plots 
                                                            
37 See Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) for a theoretical model predicting both the extensive and intensive 
margins of trade, along with an empirical implementation that deals with zero trade. 
38 Several caveats apply to these data: some genre are ad hoc classifications and are not necessarily associated with a 
country; those categories may have a current view of genre (such as “Oldies”), or US based view (such as 
International), or they may change over time (Spoken word is associated with Rap and Hip-Hop recently, but it was 
associated with Beats in the 1960’s); there is a lack of unique local categories, such as Samba from Brazil, and Fado 
from Portugal; the coverage is much better for US and Global artists, so budding artists in smaller countries are not 
represented in MUZE. 
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markets shares of genre from 1960 to 2003.  In 2003, R&B was the leading genre with 32% 
market share, followed by spoken word (19%) and rock & pop (18%).  Rock & pop achieved the 
highest market share of the sample period, reaching close to 60% in the mid-1980s’, but R&B 
displaced rock & pop as the genre leader in the mid-1990s. 
By construction, our genre data are representative of the music sold in the US, but the 
match of genre data with music charts is quite incomplete in other countries.  For example, only 
6.5% of the unique French artists that appear in the French charts were assigned to a genre, and 
they are usually artists that have more national or international recognition.  For this selected 
sample of artists outside the US and the UK, we find that 42% of them have rock & pop as the 
main genre, 23% are classified as International, 12% are R&B, and all other genre have less than 
4% participation each.  To the extent that rock & pop and R&B were originally American styles 
of music, one could infer that American genres are imitated abroad; but a conclusive answer to 
this question awaits better data. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
Using a new and novel dataset on trade in popular music among 22 countries over the 
past half century, we add to what’s known about cultural trade.  First, despite popular and 
policymaker concern over large-country dominance, we find that repertoire shares of the world 
market – and of world trade – are roughly proportional to countries’ shares of world output.  
Second, despite this rough proportionality, consumers clearly prefer domestic repertoire over 
imported music.  Third, imports favor repertoires from countries that are geographically closer 
and which share a language.  These estimates for music – a traditional and important cultural 
service – resemble the patterns observed in bilateral trade of physical goods. 
Fourth, despite rapid improvement in information and communication technologies over 
the past half century, the effects of distance and language have remained fairly constant.  Fifth, 
perhaps surprisingly, the degree of home bias has increased sharply since the late 1990s.  Sixth, 
we present evidence that this change occurs amid the adoption of the Internet, the regional 
splintering of MTV, and – in four of our countries – the growth of domestic radio airplay quotas.  
These results imply that concerns about technological change making music more easily 
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available across places do not appear to threaten the popularity of domestic artists at home.  
Moreover, it indicates that countries imposing quotas or providing subsidies to local cultural 
industries may achieve their desired goals, as several countries have ramped up their 
governmental intervention in cultural markets recently, such as China, India and Brazil. 
Overall, our findings suggest that concern about cultural domination by large economies 
– particularly the US – is misplaced for music.  The US is the largest consumer and exporter of 
music, but relative to its GDP, the US share of world music trade is sixth behind Sweden, 
Canada, Finland, the UK, and New Zealand.  We cannot extrapolate the same conclusion for 
other cultural goods, such as movies and TV programs.  The production of music requires only a 
fraction of the fixed costs demanded in the movie industry, for example, and the distribution of 
movies and TV shows depend on other channels.  Additional empirical research is necessary to 
gauge the potential effect of globalization on those goods.  
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Table 1: Artists appearing on 18+ Charts’ Top 100’s Since 2001
 
Notes: Figures based on music chart data collected for 22 countries – Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.  Our definition of nationality is based on three criteria, in order: 
place of first recorded album, country of origin, and most popular in a given country.  Avril Lavigne, Enrique 
Iglesias, and Rihanna, for example, were born in Canada, Spain and Barbados, respectively, but recorded their first 
albums in the United States.  See data section for more details about the sample. 
  
artist 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Artist nationality
Avril Lavigne 19 19 20 United States
Backstreet Boys 18 18 United States
Beyonce 21 18 United States
Black Eyed Peas 18 19 20 United States
Britney Spears 19 22 United States
Christina Aguilera 19 18 United States
Destiny's Child 18 20 19 United States
Dido 18 United Kingdom
Eminem 21 21 19 18 United States
Enrique Iglesias 19 United States
Evanescense 22 19 United States
Faith Hill 18 United States
Gnarls Barkley 18 United States
Gwen Stefani 19 United States
Jennifer Lopez 20 19 20 United States
Justin Timberlake 18 United States
Kylie Minogue 18 19 Australia
Las Ketchup 18 Spain
Madonna 19 18 19 18 United States
Mariah Carey 18 United States
Nelly Furtado 19 Canada
Outkast 18 United States
P!Nk 20 19 United States
Red Hot Chili Peppers 19 19 United States
Rihanna 18 United States
Robbie Williams 18 United Kingdom
Shaggy 18 other
Shakira 21 18 other
T.A.T.U. 21 other
Usher 18 United States
Vanessa Carlton 18 United States
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Table 2: Chart Frequency Availability 
Country Chart Entries Annual Monthly 
 
Twice monthly Weekly 
 
Argentina 5754    2001-2007 
Australia 1458 1960-2005    
Austria 55502  1965-1979 1980-1989 1990-2007 
Belgium 98964    1970-2007 
Canada 82516 1960-2006    
Chile 4319    1960-2007 
Denmark 13620    2002-2007 
Finland 12243    1994-2007 
France 86051    1995-2007 
Germany 21441    1984-2007 
Italy 37570  1960-1964, 
1978-2007 
1965-1970 1971-1977 
Japan 6418    1960-2007 
Netherlands 88760    2001-2007 
New Zealand 76057    1965-2007 
Norway 32113    1975-2007 
Portugal 8000    1960-2007 
Spain 6640    2001-2007 
Sweden 52100    2001-2007 
Switzerland 83260   1976-1993 1994-2007 
United Kingdom 175088    1968-2007 
United States 249980    1960-2007 
Notes: The complete list of chart sources is available in footnote 14. 
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Table 3: Chart Length Availability 
 Top 10- Top 15 Top 20 Top 30 Top 40 Top 50-75 Top 100 
Argentina   2002-2007  2001   
Australia   1960-1992   1993-2005  
Austria 1965-1966 1967-1984 1985-1994 1995-2000 2001-2007  
Belgium    1970-1994  1995-2007  
Brazil       1960-2006 
Canada    1969-2007 1960-1968 
Chile   2002-2007     
Denmark   1994-2007     
Finland   1995-2007     
France      1984-1997 1998-2007 
Germany   1960-1976 1977-2007    
Italy 1960-1984 1985-2006 2007    
Japan   2001-2007     
Netherlands     1965-2007   
New Zealand     1975-1978, 
2005-2007 
1979-2004 
Norway 1960-1994 1995-2007     
Portugal   2001-2005   2006-2007 
Spain   2001-2007     
Sweden   1975-1990  1991-1994 1995-2007  
Switzerland 1968-1975 1976-1982  1983-1991 1992 1993-1998 1999-2007 
United Kingdom     1960-1982; 
1992-2006 
1983-1991; 
2007 
United States       1960-2007 
Notes: The complete list of chart sources is available in footnote 14. 
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Table 4: Proportionality in World Sales, World Trade, and Home Shares, 2003-2007 
          
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Country % of GDP % of Sales % of Trade % Home 
Share 
Argentina 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 30.5% 
Australia 2.2% 0.6% 1.2% 13.4% 
Austria 0.9% 0.3% 0.7% 9.6% 
Belgium 1.0% 0.4% 0.8% 16.0% 
Brazil 5.3% 0.6% 0.2% 57.4% 
Canada 3.5% 3.2% 7.7% 31.2% 
Chile 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 17.9% 
Denmark 0.5% 0.3% 0.5% 45.5% 
Finland 0.5% 0.5% 1.0% 76.4% 
France 5.7% 3.6% 1.5% 48.1% 
Germany 7.7% 3.5% 2.9% 34.2% 
Italy 5.1% 1.2% 1.2% 35.4% 
Japan 11.9% 15.6% 0.0% 86.6% 
Netherlands 1.7% 0.8% 0.9% 33.6% 
New Zealand 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 16.1% 
Norway 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 33.2% 
Portugal 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 23.7% 
Spain 3.7% 0.9% 0.4% 42.6% 
Sweden 0.9% 1.4% 2.8% 58.8% 
Switzerland 0.8% 0.2% 0.4% 6.6% 
United 
Kingdom 5.8% 8.8% 10.9% 45.9% 
United States 38.6% 51.5% 48.0% 89.9% 
Other 4.9% 15.1% 
Unknown   1.1% 3.5%   
Notes: Column 1 calculates GDP percentages for each country based on the sum of GDP of the 22 countries in our 
sample.  Data comes from Penn World Table 6.3.  Column 2 calculates each country percentage of total 
consumption of music based on IFPI, and includes domestic consumption of music.  Column 3 calculates each 
country share of total trade only.  Column 4 calculates the share of each country’s consumption that is fulfilled by 
domestic artists. 
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Table 5: Gravity Estimates, 2003-2007 
              
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IFPI IFPI IFPI IFPI IFPI GDP 
Log Distance -0.4238 -0.3958 -0.3958 -0.3958 -0.3789 -0.3821 
 (0.0704)** (0.0711)** (0.0711)** (0.0711)** (0.0743)** (0.0745)** 
Same Language 0.8513 0.9988 0.9988 0.9988 0.9816 0.9724 
 (0.2148)** (0.2060)** (0.2060)** (0.2060)** (0.2076)** (0.2073)** 
Home Bias   0.2906 2.1134 2.7504 2.5801 2.583 
  (-0.5576) (0.3196)** (0.2824)** (0.3007)** (0.3002)** 
Distance Measure Km+1 Km+1 Km + 100 Km+500 Km+ 
nearest/2 
Km+ 
nearest/2 
Observations 922 1011 1011 1011 1011 1011 
R-squared 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Notes: Dependent variable is log imports.  Columns(1)-(5) use music sales measures.  Column (6) uses GDP.  All 
regressions include source and destination country fixed effects.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 
country pair. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Gravity Regressions across Decades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Since 2000 
Log Distance  -0.0553 -0.2666 -0.3332 -0.2566 -0.3430 
 (0.1409) (0.0616)** (0.0629)** (0.0591)** (0.0636)** 
Same Language 1.0338 1.2720 0.8569 0.7736 0.8271 
 (0.2667)** (0.1631)** (0.1739)** (0.1561)** (0.1790)** 
Home Bias 1.9597 1.0288 1.1194 1.7690 2.5836 
 (0.4375)** (0.2509)** (0.2389)** (0.2362)** (0.2637)** 
Observations 540 1115 1366 1819 1914 
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.71 
Notes: Dependent variable is log imports, based on GDP.  All regressions include source and destination country 
fixed effects.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country pair. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Determinants of Domestic Share in Music Consumption 
 
Notes: Columns 1 through 5 show regressions of the log domestic share on year dummies, country fixed effects and 
the variables shown.  The dependent variable in column 6 is log domestic share of movie consumption. Column 7 
shows similar regression for the the log domestic music share in year t-5.. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  An 
observation is a country-year. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MTV regional 0.1335 0.1644 -0.0666 0.0977
(0.0812) (0.0850) (0.1463) (0.0955)
MTV local 0.1268 0.0881 -0.1512 0.1027
(0.0799) (0.0838) (0.1503) (0.0918)
Domestic Radio Quota 1.2699 1.4863 -1.4816 0.2166
(0.3668)** (0.3732)** (0.8217) (0.4373)
Internet Penetration 0.0108 0.0129 -0.0167 0.012
(per 100 people) (0.0035)** (0.0035)** (0.0073) (0.0038)**
Observations 680 680 680 680 680 192 587
Number of groups (countries) 22 22 22 22 22 27 22
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.2 0.03 0.1
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Table 8: National Repertoire Shares of World Chart Entries, by Chart Range, 2003-2007 
Nationality top 10 next 15 next 25 remainder Total 
Argentina 1.4% 1.5% 1.9% 0.3% 1.3% 
Australia 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 1.4% 1.0% 
Austria 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% 0.8% 
Belgium 1.6% 1.4% 1.8% 2.4% 1.8% 
Brazil 2.9% 2.1% 2.9% 0.6% 2.1% 
Canada 3.4% 3.8% 4.1% 2.3% 3.4% 
Chile 1.2% 0.5% 1.4% 0.2% 0.8% 
Denmark 2.5% 2.3% 1.3% 1.1% 1.8% 
Finland 4.8% 4.6% 3.7% 4.0% 4.3% 
France 5.5% 4.5% 4.8% 6.6% 5.3% 
Germany 3.9% 4.6% 4.4% 4.9% 4.5% 
Italy 2.3% 2.1% 2.5% 1.9% 2.2% 
Japan 3.9% 3.9% 4.2% 3.3% 3.8% 
Netherlands 2.0% 2.2% 1.7% 2.9% 2.2% 
New Zealand 0.7% 0.5% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 
Norway 1.9% 1.5% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 
Portugal 1.1% 1.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.9% 
Spain 3.2% 3.0% 3.5% 1.5% 2.8% 
Sweden 4.6% 3.6% 4.0% 5.6% 4.5% 
Switzerland 0.6% 0.4% 0.6% 1.1% 0.7% 
United Kingdom 7.9% 11.4% 12.8% 19.7% 13.0% 
United States 32.8% 35.0% 32.4% 28.5% 32.2% 
Other 10.1% 6.4% 5.4% 3.6% 6.4% 
Unknown 1.7% 2.3% 2.9% 4.8% 2.9% 
Notes: Each column calculates the national repertoire shares of world chart entries, constraining the sample to parts 
of the chart availability distribution (for example, column 2 calculates shares only for all top 10 entries in each 
year/country), and it weights all entries equally. 
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Table 9: Gravity Equations across Decades: Replacing Missing Trade Values and Restricting 
Sample to Countries with Data since 1970 
              
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
B. Replacing Missing Trade Values     
Log Distance -0.1637 -0.4355 -0.5605 -0.4694 -0.6926 
 (-0.1057) (0.0814)** (0.0791)** (0.0726)** (0.0719)** 
Same Language 0.5639 1.0509 0.9417 0.6869 1.1835 
 (0.2333)* (0.2299)** (0.2086)** (0.1626)** (0.2131)** 
Home Bias 3.2285 2.2802 2.2715 2.7836 3.1269 
 (0.5907)** (0.5307)** (0.5006)** (0.4729)** (0.4546)** 
Observations 1804 2838 3190 3542 3674 
      
B. Countries with data since 1970 
Log Distance  -0.0553 -0.2819 -0.3368 -0.2238 -0.3608 
 -0.1409 (0.0670)** (0.0808)** (0.0650)** (0.0925)** 
Same Language 1.0338 1.3603 0.875 0.856 0.7016 
 (0.2667)** (0.1674)** (0.1840)** (0.1792)** (0.2138)** 
Home Bias 1.9597 0.9735 0.9456 1.576 2.0906 
 (0.4375)** (0.2606)** (0.2601)** (0.2368)** (0.3007)** 
  Observations 540 1027 1109 1325 1081 
Notes: Dependent variable is log imports, based on GDP.  All regressions include source and destination country 
fixed effects.   Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country pair.  In contrast to Table 7, missing trade 
values for a country pair are replaced with the minimum value of imports observed for an importer.  Destination 
countries with data since 1970 included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1. Music Consumption Shares and GDP Shares, 2003-2007 
 
Notes: Each dot shows each country’s average GDP share from 2003-2007 and the corresponding total music 
consumption share in the same period.  Red line is the 45 degree line.  Figure is plotted in log scale. 
 
Figure 2. Music Trade Shares and GDP Shares, 2003-2007 
 
Notes: Each dot shows each country’s average GDP share from 2003-2007 and the corresponding music trade share 
in the same period.  Red line is the 45 degree line.  Figure is plotted in log scale. 
 
  
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Denmark
Finland
FranceGermany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
US
.1
.2
.4
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
Sh
ar
es
.1 .2 .4
GDP Shares
Argentina
Australia
AustriaBelgium
Brazil
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
US
.1
.2
.4
Tr
ad
e 
S
ha
re
s
.1 .2 .4
GDP Shares
43 
 
Figure 3. Domestic Music Shares and GDP Shares, 2003-2007 
 
Notes: Each dot shows each country’s average GDP share from 2003-2007 and the corresponding consumption of 
domestic music share in the same period.  Red line is the 45 degree line.  Figure is plotted in log scale. 
 
Figure 4. Repertoire Shares of Imports, 2003-2007 
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Figure 5. Music Consumption Shares by Country, 1960-2007 
 
Notes: Gray lines show data for all countries that have small market shares.  Consumption shares calculated 
according to equation (3) in the text. 
 
Figure 6. Music Consumption Shares Divided by GDP Shares by Country, 1960-2007 
 
Notes: Gray lines show data for all countries that have small normalized market shares.  Consumption shares 
calculated according to equation (3) in the text, averaged over three years, and then divided by average GDP shares 
over the same three years.  Horizontal line of 1 represents proportionality in shares of total consumption of music. 
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Figure 7. Music Export Shares by Country, 1960-2007 
 
Notes: Gray lines show data for all countries that have small market shares.  Export shares calculated according to 
equation (3) in the text, but omitting consumption of domestic music. 
 
Figure 8. Music Export Shares Divided by GDP Shares by Country, 1960-2007 
 
Notes: Gray lines show data for all countries that have small normalized market shares.  Export shares calculated 
according to equation (3) in the text (but omitting consumption of domestic music), averaged over three years, and 
then divided by average GDP shares over the same three years.  Horizontal line of 1 represents proportionality in 
music export shares. 
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Figure 9. Overall Domestic Shares, 1960-2007 
 
Notes: Overall domestic shares calculated as the total consumption of domestic music in all countries in a given 
year, divided by the total consumption of music in that year. 
 
Figure 10. Domestic Shares By Country, 1960-2007 
 
Notes: Gray lines show data for all countries that have small domestic shares.  Domestic shares calculated as the 
total consumption of domestic music in each country in a given year, divided by the total consumption of music in 
each country in that year. 
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Figure 11. Estimated Home Bias, 1960-2007 
 
 
Figure 12. Local MTV Evolution 
 
Notes: Each dot shows the first year of local MTV activities for the assigned country.  Source: Wikipedia. 
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Figure 13. Internet Penetration, 1990-2008 
 
Notes: Graph shows box plots by year of internet users per 100 people for the countries in our sample. 
 
 
Figure 14. Domestic Shares and Radio Quotas 
 
Notes: The green line in each panel shows the percentage of consumption of domestic music in the respective 
country.  Red lines indicate the minimum percentage of radio air play devoted to domestic music according to each 
country’s legislation. 
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Figure 15: French Repertoire Share at Home and Abroad, and French Radio Quotas, 1970-2007 
 
Notes: Each panel shows the percentage of consumption of French music in the respective country.  Red lines 
indicate the minimum percentage of radio air play devoted to French music according to the legislation in France. 
 
Figure 16. Chart Convergence, 1960-2007
 
Note: the index is the ratio of (distinct artists appearing on world charts in a year)/(number of chart entries in the 
included countries).   
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Figure 17. Genre Shares, 1960-2003 
 
Notes: Gray lines show data for genre that have small world shares. 
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Appendix Table 1. GDP and IFPI shares in 2003 
      
GDP shares IFPI shares 
Argentina 1.5% 0.2% 
Australia 2.1% 2.4% 
Austria 0.9% 1.0% 
Belgium 1.0% 0.9% 
Brazil 5.2% 1.0% 
Canada 3.4% 2.3% 
Chile 0.7% 0.1% 
Denmark 0.5% 0.6% 
Finland 0.5% 0.5% 
France 5.8% 7.5% 
Germany 8.0% 7.2% 
Italy 5.3% 2.3% 
Japan 12.1% 16.9% 
Netherlands 1.7% 1.8% 
New Zealand 0.3% 0.4% 
Norway 0.6% 0.9% 
Portugal 0.7% 0.5% 
Spain 3.6% 2.1% 
Sweden 0.9% 1.0% 
Switzerland 0.8% 0.9% 
United Kingdom 5.8% 11.4% 
United States 38.5% 38.0% 
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Appendix Table 2. Shares only using “born in” criteria to define nationality 
        
country % of Sales % of Trade % Home 
Share 
Argentina 0.0% 0.0% 30.5% 
Australia 0.6% 1.1% 13.4% 
Austria 0.3% 0.7% 9.6% 
Belgium 0.4% 0.8% 16.0% 
Brazil 0.6% 0.2% 57.4% 
Canada 3.9% 9.3% 34.4% 
Chile 0.0% 0.0% 18.8% 
Denmark 0.3% 0.4% 45.5% 
Finland 0.5% 1.0% 77.1% 
France 3.6% 1.4% 48.2% 
Germany 3.5% 2.8% 34.2% 
Italy 1.2% 1.2% 35.4% 
Japan 15.6% 0.0% 86.6% 
Netherlands 0.8% 1.0% 33.6% 
New Zealand 0.2% 0.6% 16.5% 
Norway 0.3% 0.1% 33.2% 
Portugal 0.0% 0.0% 23.7% 
Spain 1.0% 0.7% 42.6% 
Sweden 1.4% 2.7% 57.5% 
Switzerland 0.2% 0.4% 6.6% 
United Kingdom 9.0% 11.4% 45.8% 
United States 50.0% 44.6% 88.1% 
other 5.3% 16.2% 
unknown 1.1% 3.4%   
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Appendix Figure 1. Export shares normalized by constant IFPI 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2. Estimated Distance and Same Language Effects, 1960-2007 
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